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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LLOYD OLSEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALDlTS D. CHAPPELL,
Defendant.

)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
S11 ATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff on a promissory note
to recover $4,523.92 plus costs of court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury.
The jury returned answers to special interrogatories
in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Trial
Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff notwithstanding
the jury's answers to the special interrogatories.
Th~

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter referred to as
Respondent, seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the
Trial Court.

·)

~TATK\I

KNT OF

FAC'l'~

RPspondPnt di:·mgTPe,..; with Appellant's Statement
of tl1P Fads: submits that Appellant's Statement of
the Fads is materially deficient; and respectfully in.
vites this H onorahle Court's attention to the record in
the particulars:
( )ne Clark .J. ()bra>· (hereinafter referred to a8
'' Ohra>· ''), in the spnng or sulllmer of

l~l63,

became

interPstPd in O}Jening a ''Dog n Suds'' drive-inn in
Layton, l~tah, and entered into negotiations with .John
P. OlsPn (hereinafter referred to as "Olsen") to pm-

chasP C'ertain equipment to he used in the proposed ,
operation. (Tr 6G) Ohray interested Appellant in the
drivP-inn as an investment: and in October or Nov- ,
PillllPr of 1963 in the Ro>·al Baker:-·. Logan, Ptah, Obray,
Oben, and Appellant had an exploratory meeting. (Tr. ,
-Hi and 47)
From the time of this meeting until July of 1964,
the date on which Olsen and Appellant next met, (Tr.
48, Lines 29 and 30; Tr. 49, Line 1) there were, according to Appellant's testimony, two telephone conversations between Olsen and Appellant. (Tr. 51, Line 30
and Tr. fi3, Lines 3-21) The record is barren of any
further contact, written or oral, between Olsen and
Appellant until Appellant was served a Summons in
this matter, at \\·hich tillle Ap}Jellant called Olsen. (Tr.
:\G, LinPs 12-1-1- and Tr. :'!8. Lines 7-12)

In the interval between the October or November
meeting mentioned above and the second telephone conversation between Appellant and Olsen, (Tr. 53) the
Appellant and Obray executed the note sued upon. (Tr.
6, lines 22-24; Tr. 7, lines 6 and 7) The note's execution
iR admitted. (Supra.} The consideration for the note
were the items of personalty listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, and a Bill of Sale to said items wa.s given from
Olsen to Obray and Appellant. (Tr. 14, 15, and 16)
The items of property were delivered to Obray. (Tr.
73-78) Appellant at page two of his Brief points out that
Appellant and Obray "as partners" executed the note
but overlooked the full context from which "as partners'' was extracted. That full context is as follow.s:
''Clark J. Obray and Aldus D. Chappell, as
Partners of Logan, Utah, and individually ... "
(emphasis added)
Appellant knew that a condition of the note was that
it be executed by him "individually." (Tr. 48, lines
19-29) Subse4uent to its execution, Appellant delivered
it to Obray; (Tr. 49, lines 24-28) and Obray delivered
the note to Olsen. (Tr. 68,.line3 13-20)
Thereafter, (Ti·. 69, lines 5-14) Appellant came

to Obray's home and advised him he wanted to "withdraw from the Partnership and have nothing more to
do with it;" (Tr. 69, lines 22 and 23; Tr. 51, lines 3-9)
and all interest of Appellant in the Partnership was
acquired by Obray. (R. 92, lines 29 and 30 and R. 93,

lines 1 and 2) Oben was not advised that A-rJpellam
had withdrmrn from the Partnership until advised of the

faet hy Obray at a date subi-lequent to the resale by
Ohra~· of the equipment purchased by Obray and Appellant from Olsen. (Tr. 70) Appellant never did advise
01:-wn of the termination of the Partnership. (Tr. 63,
linPs 7-17)

ln the .July, 1964 meeting between Appellant and
Olsen, according to Appellant's testimony, Olsen told
Appellant " . . . that Obray had sold it and that he
had made $6,000 cash on the deal and that I (Appellant-sic) was very foolish to have gotten out of this
deal and not been participating in the profits that he'd
made.'' (Tr. 64, lines 7-12) Olsen gave Appellant no
in di ca ti on on this conversation that Appellant had
been released from liahilitv on the note. (Tr. 64, lines
2;)-28 and Tr. 65)
Obray sold the La:·ton Dog n Suds drive-inn without ever having operated it at a profit of approximate!~-

$8,000.00 (Tr. 89, lines 15-17, Tr. 91) to one

Groves. (Tr. 92, lines 26-28)
The Appellant stipulated that Respondent is the
owner of the note. (Tr. 6, lines 22-30 and Tr. 7, lines
6 and 7) Payments on the note, all of which were made

hy Groves, totaled $650.00: (Tr. 14) and the payments
wPre applied to tlw note leaving an admitted balance
of

$-til2~.92,

the amount

pra~·ed

in the Complaint (R. 1)

and the amount for which judgment was granted. (R.
41 and 42)

ARGlTMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PRO-

PERLY WITHIN ITS PREROGATIVE AND CORRECTLY AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
NOTWITHSTANDING

THE

JURY'S

ANSWERS

TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, AND THERE
IS NO BASIS IN FACT FOR FINDING A MODIFICATION OF THJ1j PROMISSORY NOTE SUED
lTPON BY PLAINTIFF.
Appellant has no argument with the general proposition that:
'•A special finding by the jury is binding on,

and may not be ignored or disregarded by the
court, provided it is relevant and material to
the issues, warranted by the evidence and does
not contain an unwarranted conclusion of law,
and has not heen set aside on proper grounds.''
(89 C.J.S. 344)
However, in orde~ for the jury verdict to stand,
it must be supported hy some competent evidence.
The jury verdict iri the instant case was not supported by competent evidence and, in fact, was contrary to the express testimony of the Appellant. When
being cross examined, Mr. Chappell testified as follows:

Q.

(by Mr. Hoggan)

. . . Have you at any

time received a release of your liabilit}' on thi~
promissory note?
"\.

No, Sir. Not written.

Q. \Vell, do you claim to have received a rp_
lease of any kind?

A.

Yes, I felt when I discussed with Clark--

Q.

Not what you felt, but do you claim to have
received a release of any kind?

A.

A verbal release, yes.

Q.

Who from'?

A.

Mr. Obray.

Q. Have you at any time ever received a release from Mr. Olsen?

A.

No, Sir.

Q.

Or from anyone acting m his behalf?

A.

No.

Q.

Or from System Finance Company?

A.

No.

Q.

Or from thf> Plaintiff in this action?

A.

No.

Not withstanding this unequivocal testimony by
the Appellant, the jury found an amendment to the
note consisting of a deletion of Appellant's name therefrom. (R. 36) This course of conduct the jury said
consisted of four elements. They are:
l. The conversation on the street between Plaintiff and Defandant, in which the Plaintiff in
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effeet ex1uessed knowledge that the Defendant
was not a member of the partnership. (R. 37)
This finding hy the jury presumably has reference
to the conversation between Olsen and Appellant in
.July of 1964 and not between Appellant and Respondent. The record of Appellant's testimony on this conversation (Tr. 64, lines 2-15) shows that what Olsen
in fact did was to chide Appellant for getting out of
the partnership. Nothing in that conversation could
lw ronstrued as an intimation by Olsen that Appellant

was released on the note.
This eonversation is analagous to the situation
where two men "as partners and individually" borrow
money to buy a common stock. One withdraws from the
partnership and the other stays in. The stock goes up
and the man who stays in makes a profit. But does
the fact that the one man withdrew from the partnership relieve him of obligations incurred in borrowing
mone~' during the existance of the partnership in the
absence of an express release? Respondent submits
not. 'rhe continuation or severence of the relationship
between Chappell and Ohray was a matter of their personal concern. What they did or did not do to settle
their affairs with each other cannot affect a debt incurred during the partnership as partners in the absence
of an express release from the creditor. Appellant
admits to n0n r having reePived such a release.
1

.t\I oreover, thi8 eonversation is vague and indefinite

at very best on the question of whether Appellant was
released. It has efficacy, if at all, only in what Appellant in this own mind made of it. In this connection
the Court's attention is invited to 17 Am. J ur. 2nd
on Contracts, Section 465 on Modification at page 935
when• thP author states:
"The mental purpose of one of the parties to
a contract cannot change its terms, nor are indefinite expressions sufficient to establish a bindinq
agreement to change the formal requirement~
of a u:ritten contract." (emphasis added)
Also, in the case of Cruse v. Clawson (Montana)
352 P2d 989, there is this significant statement at
page 994:

··H owe1:er, mutital cancellation must be clearly
expressed and shown, and acts and conduct of
the parties to be sufficent must be clear, conrincing, and inconsistent with the existence of
the contract.'' (emphasis added)
As a second element in the alleged course of conduct. the jury found:

2. The correspondence written by the Plaintiff
in regards to payment of the business debts, because of lack of reference to the Defendant as
heing joinaly responsible, is sufficient evidence
in our minds that the Plaintiff agreed to the
deletion of the Defendant's name from the contract. ( R. 37)
It is pertinent to observe that the Court asked
the Jury:

lj

Did Plaintiff and Clark J. Obray, by any
coursp of conduct of which Defendant was made
muuf, ever inform Defendant in .substance and
effect that the note now sued on was amended
by deleting defendant's name therefrom? ( emphasis added) ( R. 36)
~)(a).

Appellant in presentation of his evidence laid
great stress on the point that he was totally unaware
of any dealings and correspondence between Olsen
and Ohray. (See testimon~' of Appellant Tr. 54-55 and
the testimony of Obray Tr. 78 and 83)
lt sePrns inconsistent to say that Appellant was

unaware of anything which transpired between Olsen
and Obray; to testify himself that he had no dealings
with Olsen after he told him he was out of the partnership; (Tr. 58) and yet, in the face of all this, say that
the

jur~·

's finding that there was a course of conduct

''of which Defendant was aware" (R. 36 Interrogatory
No. 3(a) ) is based on competent evidence.
ThP jun· 's third and fourth findings on a course
of conduct ( R. 37) can hP treated together.

They are:

:5. The transfer of the franchise from the Plain-

tiff to Clark Obray, without the Defendant's
name heing placed upon it.

-!. The fact that Clark Obray sold the business
without the Defendant's participation in any
way is in our opinion a course of action which
would inform the Defendant that hi.;; name was
rleleted from the contract.

I
!

]()

\\'hen the App€llant withdrew from his partnership
with Ohray, Obray acquired all interest of Appellant
in the equipment which was consideration for the note
.sued UJjOn. ( &w the testimony of Obray Tr. 92, lines

29 and 30, and Tr. 93, lines 1-6) Obray sold the equipment and business in which it was installed without
(:)Ver having operated it but after his partnership with
Appellant was terminated. (Tr. 92, lines 26-27)
Inasmuch as Obray, upon termination of the partnership with Appellant, acquired the property rights
and interests of Appellant, it is entirely consistent
for Olsen (presumably the person referred to in the

jury's answer as Plaintiff) to have dealt entirely with
Obray. Obray simply sold what he owned himself, and
the fact that Appellant was not consulted could hardly
he characterized as a course of conduct ''. . . of which
Defendant was aware" and which released Appellant
on the note.
In addition, Appellant testified that when demand
was made upon him for payment by System Finance
Company, he sent the notices to Obray with notation,
"I, of course, am not involved in this situation. Will
~Tou please have me taken off." (Tr. 55) Appellant
acknowledges by the statement ''. . . have me taken
off,'' that he was on. Appellant also testified that he
never advised Olsen of the termination of the partnerahip (Tr. 63. lines 14-17) and that Olsen never did

1I
an~·thing

to indicate to ,\ppellant that Appellant was

not being held liable on the note. (Tr. 65, lines 15-26)
rrl1e 11 rial Court, after reflecting on all of the
evidence, was led to conclude:
'1 HE CO-CRT: l think that the Court has car1

ried in its mind all the way through was not
any question about inconsistencies in the answers by the triers of the fact, but the fact that
there was insufficient facts to Justify the Court
e1:er sitbmitting it to the jury. (emphasis added)
(Tr. 129-130)
The case of Majerus vs. Guelsow, Minn. 113 N.vV.
2d ±50, cited by Appellant at page eight of his Brief gives
ample authority to the Court for entering judgment
for Plaintiff in this case, notwithstanding the jury's
findings.
11 he law on the subject of modification of con-

tracts is well stated in 17 Am. Jur.2nd on Contracts
under the section titled "~1odification" at page 93;),
8ection 4ti5, where we read:
·'To be effective as a modification, the new
agreement must possess all the elements necessary to form a contract. A modification of a
contract requires the assent of both, or all,
parties to the contract. Mutual assent is as much
a requisite element in effecting a contractual
modification as it is in the initial creation of
a contract.
'' 11 he mental purpose of one of the parties to

a eontract eannot ehan.ge ibi terms. nor are

l :2

indefinite expressions sufficient to establish
a binding agreement to change the .formal re.
quirements of a written contract. A request
suggestion, or proposal of alteration or modi
ication, made after an unconditional acceptance
of an off er, and not assented to by the oppositf'
party, does not affect the contract then in force
ahd effect hy r<>ason of the acceptance. One
reeeiving an off er to change a contract to whieh
he is a party is held to be under no obligation
to answer it; and his silence cannot be construed
as an acceptance where nothing else is shown.
Mere negotations between the parties will not
suffice to produce a modification. Before that
result can be accomplished, the negotiations
must ripen into a mutual, 1lalid, and enforceable
a.nreement to modify the old contract." (emphasis
added)
Counsel for Respondent submits that there is nothing in the record to establish, either by word or
conduct, a '' ... mutual assent ... '' to its modification
by release of Defendant from liability.
The closest Utah case in point which counsel has
.been able to locate is Green v. Garn, 11 Ut. 2d 375,
359 P2d 1050. In that ease, Green sold a business to
Garn . and as part of the consideration for the sale
took a promissory note for $5,000. Garns were unable
to make a go of the business, and Green told them if
they would list the property through him, he would
make certain concessions on a sale, including release
:_0£ ·Garns when a new contract was negotiated. Garns
did not list throu~h Greens hut rather sold the business
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through another broker to Messers. Burrows, Jensen,
and Payne. Burrows, Jensen, and Payne defaulted,
and Garns sued them. Green filed a suit in intervention and claimed the $10,000 which Burrows, Jensen,
and Payne owed Garns.
Garns argued that smce Green claimed against
Burrows, Jensen, and Payne, he had released Garns.
This argument is analogous to the argument of Appellant that he was released because Olsen attempted
to collect from and dealt with Obray. The Utah Court
at page 1053 said:
"The fact that he (Green) was willing to accept
and claimed the right to receive payment of
$10,000 from Burrows, Jensen, and Payne does
not discharge the obligation of the Garns ... ''
Garn further argued that the conduct of Green
in surrendering possession to Garn who in turn surrendered possession to Burrows, Jensen, and Payne
was conduct amounting to abandonment by Green of
his rights against Garn. This is analogous to Appellant's claim that Obray's conduct in taking possession
and operating the equipment amounted to a release
by Olsen of Appellant and an acceptance of Obray.
The Utah Court observed at page 1053:
''But it does not follow from the Garn 's ·surrender of the premises that Green surrendered
his rights."

14

TliP Court thPn statt>d that tlw:
··. . . offer of Ureen to allow the Garns to try
to work out smne means to help their predic~
rnent certain!~- cannot be construed as an abandonment of his rights under his contract with
them."' ( Ihid 10~3-;)4)
Again, the Court in concluding there was no such
conduct
said:

h~-

Green as to evidence a release of Garns

·'Green never entered into a new contract \vi th
the purchasers of the Garns' interests." (Ibid p.

1054)

Nor <lid Olsen ever enter into a new agreement
with the purchaser of Appellant's interest. The reason
is clear. Olsen never intended to or did release Appellant.
CONCLeSION
The evidenct> in this case led the learned Trial
Court inexorably to its Conclusion and Judgment in
in this matter. The Court bottomed that Judgment on
sound facts and acted within its judicial prerogatives
with discretion and candor. The Trial Court's Judgment should he affirmed.
I~espectfully

Submitt~d,

OLSON & HOGGAN
L. Rrent Hoggan
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

